Why I am not Epicurean, or the practical critique of Epicureanism
"Hey, do you know Epicurus? Why aren't you Epicurean?"
I'm often asked this question. I'll take pleasure in answering it, not in a thorough way, but directly: for a true critique of Epicureanism, in due form, I encourage you to delve into the classic refutation of utilitarian hedonism available from one of your favorite philosophy professors.
My intention is not, here, to refute Epicureanism (yet, it goes without saying: denial of the spiritual and moral order, of responsibility and merit, of remorse and regret) no, I leave these remarks aside: let's take the matter from the difficult side, and suppose that Epicureanism is approachable.
Do I still have a reason not to be Epicurean?
Yes.
And a good one:
Epicureanism doesn't keep its promises.
What do you mean?
Let me explain.
First, Epicureanism claims to be a practical philosophy; that is, one that brings happiness for all. And for Epicurus, happiness, the ideal, the sovereign good, is the absence of pain. But is Epicurean happiness worth it? Certainly, the pleasure offered by Epicurus is simpler to obtain, less difficult: it's easier not to seek pain than to procure pleasure. Okay. But are we really satisfied with it? Isn't this the mark of the corpse or the sleeping man, rather than the living? In the end, the happiness achieved is nothing more than the shadow of pleasure, just its image. Epicureanism tells us that life after death and the idea of another world are chimeras: reading it, we come to understand that a happy life before death is no less one.
But okay. Let's concede (for the exercise) that happiness is the absence of pain. Then, is happiness easier to obtain? No. According to Epicurus himself, we have needs. Futile needs, and natural needs. And this natural need must be satisfied, sine qua non. No matter the conditions, this need MUST be satisfied. Epicurus reassures us: a simple crust of bread and a glass of water are enough to sustain oneself. Certainly. But what (or who) guarantees us that we will eat tomorrow? Whether I can eat tomorrow is a completely different question. And there, where is the tranquility of knowing that this will be the case? The wise man who awaits the future, confident, should rather enjoy the present without hoping for the next day: the slightest unfulfilled natural desire brings pain and worry. And that's if there were only those! Who doesn't fear getting hurt, or moping? The fine business of the carpet salesman to say that the stronger a pain is, the less it lasts: should I present the cases of chronic pain from which many patients suffer? Or depression?
Faced with this problem, let's reread Epicurus: what to do in the face of a future or present evil? An even more hollow remedy than the previous one: the wise man must, he says, console himself by thinking of past joys and hoping for them in the future. Fine business: has one never had a sharper pain in experiencing the contrast of a joy lost forever for a lasting evil? And by removing the hope of a better life or another world, Epicurus offers only as a solution to the one overwhelmed by pain to throw oneself into death, thus ending the feeling of suffering. Let us hope that current Epicureans are strong and do not follow the best disciple that was Lucretius in ending his days. Although, is it really necessary to reach such ends to realize that his philosophy isn't worth living?
Come on, let's be nice: I'll concede again. Let's give the Epicurean sage the luxury of enjoying, without counting, fortune, health and enjoyment. Happiness, in short. Well, happiness... Precisely, is happiness really achieved? No. Because the last Epicurean difficulty appears, and it's a big one: death. Death awaits everyone, the sage like the idiot. And for an Epicurean, it is not, as a good materialist who respects himself, a new beginning, but a complete annihilation. There remains the "final frontier". What does our Athenian propose? A sophism (another one, we'll say): "when we are, death is not there; when death is there we are no more" (the sophistical error here is to consider death as a thing in itself - reification). No matter what the fine talker says, the reality of things changes nothing: death at the end of life is enough to transform happiness into real torture. The slightest morsel of enjoyment, hard-won, uncertain in the future, doesn't last, and will end one day. The happy days are in fact only anticipated deprivations, a meager dish from which the first comer snatches the food from the mouth. Let's remove the other world: all that remains then is time on reprieve, where the certainty of the end and of pain annihilate from all sides the meager satisfaction. The tranquil vision of the sage transforms into an impossible race against the clock: we must live in the present moment as best as possible, maximize our search for the "lesser evil" at every moment... without pushing too hard on pain of depriving ourselves even more of what we hoped to gain!
Thus, Epicurus can do what he wants, he can well sell his happiness at a bargain, he can undress and live naked so as not to lose his shirt, his promise doesn't hold: he's sure of nothing, he assures no one of ataraxia, and even less spiritual felicity. Compared to Aristotle, his happiness is just a matter of chance, far from a strong and lasting virtue: faced with the absence of certainty of immortality, he offers only a progressive flight of enjoyment in a torrent of regret and suffering.
What can we desire, in all that?
Fine business that is this flabby tranquility. I drive the last nail to our dear philosopher: far from his promise, following his vision of unachievable happiness, he condemns man to inaction, for fear of disturbing his fragile happiness by any effort. Live longer, for what? That would only increase my chances of suffering and being sad. The Epicurean man locks himself up, desperately fleeing suffering: considered by Epicurus as absolute Evil, it has no definitive solution. Faced with this, what to do? Let the happy ones become discouraged wondering if ultimately it's worth living in fear of seeing things get worse?
No. They will just have to be shown this philosophy in its true usefulness: to show, by absurdity and by impossibility, that happiness without God, without effort, without tomorrow and without morality, is the most elusive of illusions.